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Abstract. Verification of functional correctness of control programs is
an essential task for the development of space electronics; it is difficult
and time-consuming and typically outweighs design and programming
tasks in terms of development hours. We present a verification approach
designed to help spacecraft engineers reduce the effort required for formal
verification of low-level control programs executed on custom hardware.
The approach uses a metalanguage to describe the semantics of a pro-
gram as a state transformer, which can be compiled to multiple targets
for testing, formal verification, and code generation. The metalanguage
itself is embedded in a strongly-typed host language (Haskell), providing
a way to prove program properties at the type level, which can shorten
the feedback loop and further increase the productivity of engineers.
The verification approach is demonstrated on an industrial case study.
We present REDFIN, a processing core used in space missions, and its
formal semantics expressed using the proposed metalanguage, followed
by a detailed example of verification of a simple control program.
Keywords: formal verification, instruction set architecture, functional
programming, domain-specific languages.
1 Introduction
Software bugs play a major role in the history of spacecraft accidents [14]. There
are recorded cases of mission-ending bugs that would have been difficult to pre-
vent (e.g. caused by concurrency or updates) but also plain integer overflows [3]
and incorrect unit conversion [2], which should have been eradicated long ago.
Alas, there is no silver bullet. Testing is supported by mature methodologies
and frameworks, but does not provide the full correctness guarantee. General-
purpose strongly-typed languages can be used to eliminate important classes of
bugs, but are less familiar to software engineers and are often not suitable for
highly resource-constrained microarchitectures used in space electronics. Formal
modelling methods provide a systematic approach for developing complex sys-
tems in a correct-by-construction manner, but they are still at the bleeding-edge
of computing science and can be difficult to apply to real-life systems. This paper
combines known formal verification and programming languages techniques and
presents a formal verification approach for simple control tasks, such as satellite
power management, which are executed on a real processing core used in space
missions. We believe the presented ideas are transferable to other domains with
similar safety and resource requirements, e.g. biomedical applications.
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2Fig. 1. Overview of the presented formal verification approach.
Fig. 1 shows an overview of the presented approach. The bottom part corre-
sponds to conventional code generation and simulation, where REDFIN1 assem-
bly language is executed by simulating the effect of each instruction on the state
of the processor and memory. The corresponding state transformer is typically
implicit and intertwined with the rest of the simulation infrastructure. The main
idea of our approach is to represent the state transformer explicitly so that it can
be symbolically manipulated and used not only for simulation but also for for-
mal verification by compiling it into an SMT formula. We can then use an SMT
solver, e.g. Z3 [6], to verify that the state transformer of a given program satisfies
certain properties, for example, that integer overflow cannot occur regardless of
input parameters and that the program always terminates within given time.
By embedding the state transformer metalanguage in Haskell we can read-
ily implement compilers from higher-level typed languages to untyped assembly,
eradicating incorrect number and unit conversion bugs. As shown at the top of
Fig. 1, engineers can write high-level control programs for the REDFIN archi-
tecture directly in a small subset of Haskell. These high-level programs can be
used for type-safe code generation and as executable specifications of intended
functionality for the purposes of program synthesis and equivalence checking.
We first introduce the REDFIN processing core (§2), and then describe and
discuss the presented approach (§3-§5). Related work is reviewed in §6.
1 REDFIN stands for ‘REDuced instruction set for Fixed-point & INteger arithmetic’.
This instruction set and the corresponding processing core were developed by RUAG
Space Austria GmbH for space missions. See §2 for more details.
32 The REDFIN overview
For many spacecraft subsystems integrated circuits are required to perform con-
trol tasks or simple data processing. Typically, these integrated circuits are re-
alised with FPGAs (Field Programmable Gate Arrays) due to their flexibility
and lower costs compared to ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit) de-
velopment & fabrication. Since FPGAs can be used to implement arbitrary cir-
cuit functions including processor cores, it is possible to perform tasks both
in hardware and in software. However, modern space-qualified FPGAs, which
can withstand radiation in Earth orbit or deep space, have a limited amount of
programmable resources. Therefore, it is often not feasible to implement a fully-
fledged processor system in such an FPGA next to the mission-specific circuitry.
The REDFIN instruction set was developed to address this issue and, more
specifically, to meet the following goals: (i) simple instruction set to achieve a
small hardware footprint, (ii) reduced complexity to support formal verification
of programs, and (iii) deterministic behaviour for real-time applications.
2.1 REDFIN instruction set and microarchitecture
The instruction set architecture offers a configurable bit width for the data path,
ranging from 8 to 64 bits. Instruction words have a fixed width of 16 bits. The
instruction set is based on a register-memory architecture, i.e. instructions can
fetch their operands from registers as well as directly from the memory. This
architecture favours a small register set, which minimises the hardware footprint
of the processing core. Furthermore, the number of instructions in a program
is typically smaller in comparison to traditional load/store architectures where
all operands have to be transferred to registers before any operations can be
performed. There are 47 instructions of the following types:
– Load/store instructions for moving data words between general- and special-
purpose registers and the memory, as well as load of immediate values.
– Arithmetic operations for integer and fixed-point numbers. In the latter case
the number of fractional bits can be adjusted by a processor register.
– Bitwise logical and shift operations.
– Control flow instructions and associated comparison operations.
– Bus access instructions for read & write operations on an AMBA AHB bus.
The REDFIN processing core fetches instruction and data words from a small
and fast on-chip SRAM. This only allows for execution of simple programs, how-
ever, it also eliminates the need to implement caches and thus removes a source
of non-determinism of conventional processors. Since computing performance is
not one of the main goals, the processor core is non-pipelined and therefore does
not need to resolve data or control hazards or perform any form of speculative
execution. These properties greatly simplify worst case execution time analysis.
2.2 Requirements for formal verification
Verification of functional correctness of REDFIN programs, as defined by a re-
quirement specification, clearly is an essential task for the development of space
electronics. There are also important non-functional requirements, such as worst
4case execution time and energy consumption, which rely on the implementa-
tion guarantees provided by the processing core. In order to reduce verification
complexity, the REDFIN core only allows to execute a single subroutine whose
execution is triggered by a higher-level controller in the system. The implemen-
tation also guarantees that concurrent bus accesses to the processor registers or
memory do not affect the subroutine execution time. Furthermore, the processor
does not implement interrupt handling. All these measures are taken in order to
provide real-time subroutine execution guarantees and make the verification of
non-functional properties feasible within the presented verification framework.
Despite these restrictions the REDFIN core has already proven its effective-
ness for simple control tasks and arithmetic computations as part of an antenna
pointing unit for satellites. Nevertheless, verification can be difficult and time-
consuming, even for small and simple programs. Verification activities, following
engineering standards for space electronics, typically outweigh programming and
design tasks by a factor of two in terms of development hours. Usually verification
is performed via program execution on an instruction set simulator or a hard-
ware model of the processor. Manually deriving test cases from the specification
is cumbersome and error-prone and simulation times can become prohibitively
long with a large number of tests that are often needed to reach the desired func-
tional and code coverage. Formal verification methods can prove that a program
satisfies certain properties for all possible test cases and are therefore immensely
valuable for completing the verification with superior efficiency and quality.
3 State transformer
In this section we formally define the REDFIN microarchitecture and express the
semantics of the instruction set as an explicit and symbolic state transformer.
3.1 The REDFIN microarchitecture state
The main idea of the presented approach is to use an explicit state-transformer
semantics of the REDFIN microarchitecture. The state space of the entire pro-
cessing core is a Cartesian product of state spaces of every component:
S = {(r,m, ic, ir, p, f, c) : r ∈ R,m ∈M, ic ∈ A, ir ∈ I, p ∈ P, f ∈ F, c ∈ C},
where R is the set of register bank configurations; M is the memory state space;
A is the set of instruction addresses (the instruction counter ic stores the address
of the current instruction); I is the set of instruction codes (the instruction
register ir stores the code of the current instruction); P is the set of programs;
F is the set of the flag register configurations; and C is the set of clock values.
Fig. 2 shows the translation of the above into Haskell types. Note that the
types are not parameterised: recall that REDFIN is parameterised, e.g. the data
width can be chosen depending on mission requirements, whereas we use fixed 64-
bit data path for the sake of simplicity. The chosen names are self-explanatory,
for example, the data type State directly corresponds to the set of states S.
We defined SymbolicValue and SymbolicArray type constructors on top of
Levent Erkok’s symbolic verification library SBV [1], which we use as the SMT
5data State = State { registers :: RegisterBank
, memory :: Memory
, instructionCounter :: InstructionAddress
, instructionRegister :: InstructionCode
, program :: Program
, flags :: Flags
, clock :: Clock }
type Register = SymbolicValue Word2
type Value = SymbolicValue Int64
type RegisterBank = SymbolicArray Word2 Int64
type MemoryAddress = SymbolicValue Word8
type Memory = SymbolicArray Word8 Int64
type InstructionAddress = SymbolicValue Word8
type InstructionCode = SymbolicValue Word16
type Program = SymbolicArray Word8 Word16
data Flag = Condition | Overflow | Halt | ...
type Flags = SymbolicArray Flag Bool
type Clock = SymbolicValue Word64
Fig. 2. Basic types for encoding REDFIN microarchitecture in Haskell.
translation and verification frontend. In principle, any other SMT frontend can
be used, but to the best of our knowledge, SBV is the most mature SMT library
available for Haskell. We briefly overview all State components below.
Data values, registers and memory 64-bit data values (Int64) are stored
in registers and memory. There are 4 registers (addressed by Word2) and 256
memory locations (addressed by Word8). Their content is represented by symbolic
arrays that can be accessed via SBV’s functions readArray and writeArray.
Instructions and programs REDFIN instructions are represented by 16-bit
InstructionCode, whose 6 leading bits contain the instruction opcode, and the
remaining 10 bits are allocated for various instruction arguments. The Program
is a symbolic array mapping 8-bit instruction addresses to instruction codes.
Status flags and clock The microarchitecture stores execution status flags to
support conditional branching, track integer overflow, and terminate the pro-
gram, as captured by the data type Flag (we omit a few other flags for brevity).
The flag register is a symbolic map from flags to Boolean values. The Clock is
a 64-bit counter incremented on each clock cycle. Status flags and the clock are
used for diagnostic, formal verification and worst-case execution time analysis.
3.2 Instruction and program semantics
We can now define the formal semantics of REDFIN instructions and programs
in terms of a state transformer T : S → S, i.e. a function that maps states to
states. We distinguish between instructions and programs by using Haskell’s list
notation, for example, Tnop is the semantics of the instruction nop ∈ I, whereas
T[nop] is the semantics of the single-instruction program [nop] ∈ P .
6Definition (program semantics): The semantics of a program p ∈ P is
inductively defined as follows:
– The semantics of the empty program [] ∈ P coincides with the semantics of
the instruction nop and is the identity state transformer: T[] = Tnop = id.
– The semantics of the single-instruction program [i] ∈ P is a composition
of three state transformers: (i) fetching the instruction from the program
memory (denoted by Tfetch), (ii) incrementing the instruction counter (Tinc),
and (iii) the state transformer of the instruction itself (Ti), that is:
Tfetch = (r,m, ic, ir, p, f, c) 7→ (r,m, ic, p[ic], p, f, c + 1)
Tinc = (r,m, ic, ir, p, f, c) 7→ (r,m, ic + 1, ir, p, f, c)
T[i] = Ti ◦ Tinc ◦ Tfetch.
– The semantics of the composite program i:p ∈ P , where the operator : prepends
an instruction i ∈ I to a program p ∈ P , is defined as Ti:p = Tp ◦ T[i].
We represent state transformers in Haskell using the state monad, a classic
approach to emulating mutable state in a purely functional programming lan-
guage [22]. We call our state monad Redfin and define it2 as follows:
data Redfin a = Redfin { transform :: State -> (a, State) }
Every computation with the return type Redfin a yields a value of type a and
possibly alters the State of the REDFIN microarchitecture. As an example,
below we express the state transformer Tinc using the Redfin monad.
incrementInstructionCounter :: Redfin ()
incrementInstructionCounter = Redfin $ \current -> ((), next)
where
next = current { instructionCounter = instructionCounter current + 1 }
In words, the state transformer looks up the value of the instructionCounter in
the current state and replaces it in the next state with the incremented value.
The type Redfin () indicates that the computation does not produce any value
as part of the state transformation. Such computations directly correspond to
REDFIN programs and can be composed using the operator >>. For example,
fetchInstruction >> incrementInstructionCounter is the state transformer
Tinc ◦Tfetch assuming that fetchInstruction corresponds to Tfetch. We can also
use Haskell’s powerful do-notation to compose computations:
readInstructionRegister :: Redfin InstructionCode
readInstructionRegister = Redfin $ \s -> (instructionRegister s, s)
executeInstruction :: Redfin ()
executeInstruction = do fetchInstruction
incrementInstructionCounter
instructionCode <- readInstructionRegister
decodeAndExecute instructionCode
2 A generic version of this monad is available in standard module Control.Monad.State.
7Here readInstructionRegister extracts the instruction code from the current
state without modifying it. This function is used in executeInstruction, which
defines the semantics of the REDFIN execution cycle. We omit the definition of
decodeAndExecute for brevity: it is a case analysis of 47 opcodes that returns
the matching instruction. We introduce several interesting instructions below.
Halting the processor If the halt instruction is encountered, the processor
sets the flag Halt, thereby stopping the execution of the current subroutine until
a new one is started by a higher-level system controller that resets Halt. The
auxiliary function writeFlag is used to do the actual flag modification.
halt :: Redfin ()
halt = writeFlag Halt true
writeFlag :: Flag -> SymbolicValue Bool -> Redfin ()
writeFlag flag value = Redfin $ \s -> ((), s')
where s' = s { flags = writeArray (flags s) (flagId flag) value }
Arithmetics As a more involved example, consider the semantics of the instruc-
tion abs. It reads a register and writes back the absolute value of its contents3.
The semantics accounts for the potential integer overflow that leads to the nega-
tive resulting value when the input is −263 (REDFIN uses the two’s complement
signed number representation). The overflow is flagged by setting Overflow.
abs :: Register -> Redfin ()
abs rX = do
state <- readState
result <- fmap Prelude.abs (readRegister rX)
let (_, overflowState) = transform (writeFlag Overflow true) state
writeState $ ite (result .< 0) overflowState state
writeRegister rX result
Here, SBV’s symbolic if-then-else operation ite is used to merge two possible
next states, one of which has the Overflow flag set. We use auxiliary functions
readRegister, writeRegister, readState and writeState — simple state
transformers defined similarly to readInstructionRegister and writeFlag.
Conditional branching As an example of a control flow instruction, consider
the conditional branching instruction jmpi_ct, which tests the Condition flag,
and adds the provided offset to the instruction counter if the flag is set.
jmpi_ct :: SymbolicValue Int8 -> Redfin ()
jmpi_ct offset = do ic <- readInstructionCounter
condition <- readFlag Condition
let ic' = ite condition (ic + offset) ic
writeInstructionCounter ic'
After working through the above examples, it is worth noting that we use our
Haskell encoding of the state transformer as a metalanguage. We are operating
the REDFIN core as a puppet master, using external meta-notions of addition,
3 We use Prelude.abs to distinguish between the instruction and the function from the
standard library Prelude; fmap applies Prelude.abs to the result of readRegister.
8comparison and let-binding. From the processor’s point of view, we have infinite
memory and act instantly, which gives us unlimited modelling power. For exam-
ple, we can run a simulation of the processor environment in an external tool
and feed its result to writeRegister as if it was obtained in a single clock cycle.
3.3 Symbolic simulation
Having defined the semantics of REDFIN instructions and programs, we can
implement symbolic simulation of the processor:
simulate :: Int -> State -> State
simulate steps state
| steps <= 0 = state
| otherwise = ite halted state (simulate (steps - 1) nextState)
where
halted = readArray (flags state) (flagId Halt)
nextState = snd $ transform executeInstruction state
The function takes a number of simulation steps N and an initial symbolic
state of the processor as input, and executes N instructions using the previously
defined executeInstruction function. In each state we need to merge two pos-
sible futures depending on the value of the Halt flag: (i) continue the simulation
starting from the nextState if the flag is not set, and (ii) remain in the current
state if the flag is set, since in this case the processor must remain idle.
Symbolic simulation is very powerful. It allows us to formally verify properties
of REDFIN programs by fixing some parts of the state to constant values (for
example, the program code), and then checking assertions on the resulting values
of the symbolic part of the state. This will be discussed in the next section §4.
4 Formal verification
This section presents the formal verification framework developed on top of the
REDFIN semantic core (§3) demonstrating the following steps of the workflow:
– Develop programs either in low-level REDFIN assembly, or in a high-level
and statically type-checked expression language embedded in Haskell.
– Initialise, execute and test REDFIN programs on concrete input values.
– Formulate and refine functional correctness and worst case execution time
properties in the SBV property specification language.
– Verify the properties with an SMT solver.
– Receive the verification results (e.g. counterexamples) for analysis.
As our running example, consider the following simple spacecraft control task.
Let t1 and t2 be two different time points (measured in ms), and p1 and
p2 be two power values (measured in mW). Calculate the estimate of the
total energy consumption during this period using linear approximation,
rounding down to the nearest integer:
energyEstimate(t1, t2, p1, p2) =
⌊ |t1 − t2| ∗ (p1 + p2)
2
⌋
.
9This task looks too simple, but in fact it has a few critical pitfalls that, if left
unattended, may lead to the failure of the whole space mission. Examples of sub-
tle bugs in seemingly simple programs leading to a catastrophe include 64-bit to
16-bit number conversion overflow causing the destruction of Ariane 5 rocket [3]
and the loss of NASA’s Mars climate orbiter due to incorrect units of measure-
ment conversion [2]. Let us develop and verify a REDFIN program for this task.
Writing the program We can write programs either directly in the untyped
REDFIN assembly, or in a typed higher-level expression language. Both have
their advantages: the former allows engineers to hand-craft highly optimised
programs under tight resource constraints, and the latter brings type-safety and
faster prototyping. Our first prototype therefore uses the high-level approach.
Using Haskell’s polymorphism, we can define an expression that can be used
both as a Haskell function and a high-level REDFIN expression:
energyEstimate :: Integral a => a -> a -> a -> a -> a
energyEstimate t1 t2 p1 p2 = abs (t1 - t2) * (p1 + p2) `div` 2
We implement the energy estimation program by embedding the energyEstimate
expression into a REDFIN Script. Due to the lack of space we omit the imple-
mentation of Script, but one can think of it as a restricted version of the Redfin
state transformer, which we use to write programs that can manipulate the pro-
cessor state only by executing instructions, e.g. the only way to set the Overflow
flag is to execute an arithmetic instruction that actually has an overflow.
1 energyEstimateHighLevel :: Script
2 energyEstimateHighLevel = do
3 let t1 = read (IntegerVariable 0)
4 t2 = read (IntegerVariable 1)
5 p1 = read (IntegerVariable 2)
6 p2 = read (IntegerVariable 3)
7 temp = Temporary 4
8 stack = Stack 5
9 compile r0 stack temp (energyEstimate t1 t2 p1 p2)
10 halt
Here the type IntegerVariable is used to statically distinguish between integer
and fixed-point numbers, Temporary to mark temporary words, so they cannot
be mixed with inputs and outputs, and Stack to denote the location of the stack
pointer. The let block declares six adjacent memory addresses: four input values
{t1, t2, p1, p2}, a temporary word and a stack pointer. The compile function call
at line 9 performs the embedding of the high-level energyEstimate expression
into the assembly language by translating it to a sequence of REDFIN instruc-
tions. The first argument of the compile function holds the register r0 which
contains the estimated energy value after the program execution.
Simulating the program We run symbolic simulation for 100 steps, initialising
the program and data memory of the processor using the helper function boot.
10
main :: IO ()
main = do
let dataMemory = [10, 5, 3, 5, 0, 100]
finalState = simulate 100 (boot energyEstimateHighLevel dataMemory)
printMemoryDump 0 5 (memory finalState)
putStrLn $ "R0: " ++ show (readArray (registers finalState) r0)
As the simulation result we get a finalState value. We can inspect it by printing
relevant components: the values of the first six memory cells, and the result of
the computation located in the register r0. Note that the stack pointer (cell 5)
holds 100 as in the initial state, which means the stack is empty.
Memory dump: [10, 5, 3, 5, 5, 100]
R0: 20
Simulating programs with concrete input values is useful for diagnostic and
test. However, to formally verify their functional correctness, we need to inspect
every valid combination of input values, which can be done by an SMT solver.
This allows us to discover a trap hidden in our energy estimation program.
Verifying the program The project lead engineer defined a set of functional
requirements for the energy monitoring subsystem. The software engineering
team received the specification, implemented the energy monitoring subroutines,
and started the verification. One of the requirements is as follows.
Assuming that values p1 and p2 are non-negative integers, the energy
estimation subroutine must always return a non-negative integer value.
To check that the program complies with the requirement, we translate the
symbolic state transformer energyEstimateHighLevel into an SMT formula,
and formulate the following theorem. Lines 13-14 extract the computed result
and the value of the flag Halt from the finalState. Lines 15-16 require that
the processor has halted, the result is equal to that computed by the high-level
Haskell expression energyEstimate and is non-negative.
1 theorem = do
2 -- Initialise symbolic variables:
3 t1 <- forall "t1"
4 t2 <- forall "t2"
5 p1 <- forall "p1"
6 p2 <- forall "p2"
7 -- Constrain p1 and p2 to be non-negative:
8 constrain $ p1 .>= 0 &&& p2 .>= 0
9 -- Initialise the data memory with symbolic variables:
10 let dataMemory = [t1, t2, p1, p2, 0, 100]
11 finalState = simulate 100 (boot energyEstimateHighLevel dataMemory)
12 result = readArray (registers finalState) r0
13 halted = readArray (flags finalState) (flagId Halt)
14 -- Specify the requirements as a property for verification:
15 return $ halted &&& result .== energyEstimate t1 t2 p1 p2
16 &&& result .>= 0
11
The resulting SMT formula has 122 clauses and can be checked by Z3 in 3.0s4:
> proveWith z3 theorem
Falsifiable. Counter-example:
t1 = 5190405167614263295 :: Int64
t2 = 0 :: Int64
p1 = 149927859193384455 :: Int64
p2 = 157447350457463356 :: Int64
The solver has found a counterexample demonstrating that the program does
not satisfy the above requirement. Indeed, the expression evaluates to a negative
value on the provided inputs due to an integer overflow. The following refined
requirement is then provided by the project lead engineer:
According to the spacecraft power system specification, p1 and p2 are
non-negative integers that do not exceed 1W. The time is measured from
the mission start, hence t1 and t2 are non-negative and do not exceed the
time span of the mission, which is 30 years. Under these assumptions, the
energy estimation subroutine must return a non-negative integer value.
The software engineering team modifies the time5 and power constraints:
constrain $ t1 .>= 0 &&& t1 .<= toMilliSeconds (30 :: Year)
constrain $ t2 .>= 0 &&& t2 .<= toMilliSeconds (30 :: Year)
constrain $ p1 .>= 0 &&& p1 .<= toMilliWatts ( 1 :: Watt)
constrain $ p2 .>= 0 &&& p2 .<= toMilliWatts ( 1 :: Watt)
We rerun Z3 (now on 134 SMT clauses) and get the desired outcome in 4.8s:
> proveWith z3 theorem
Q.E.D.
The refinement of the requirement has rendered the integer overflow impossible,
in particular, we can now be sure that abs cannot be called with −263 within the
mission parameters. This kind of guarantee fundamentally requires solving an
SMT problem, even if it is done at the type level, e.g. using refinement types [21].
Checking program equivalence The statically typed high-level expression
language is very convenient for writing REDFIN programs, however, an experi-
enced engineer can often find a way to improve the resulting code. In some partic-
ularly resource-constrained situations, a fully hand-crafted assembly code may be
required. As an example, a direct unoptimised translation of the energyEstimate
expression into assembly uses 79 instructions, most of them for Stack manipula-
tion. On the other hand, it is not difficult to write a low-level assembly program
that computes the result using only 9 instructions as we demonstrate below.
4 All reported results are obtained on a laptop with 2.90GHz Intel Core i5-4300U
processor, 8GB RAM (3MB cache), and the SMT solver Z3 version 4.5.1 (64-bit).
5 We are not absolutely precise here. We do not distinguish between regular and leap
years, and use a conservative upper bound of 366 days per year.
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To facilitate the development of verified hand-crafted code, we use an SMT
solver to check the equivalence of REDFIN programs by verifying that they
produce the same output on all valid inputs. This allows an engineer to manually
optimise a given high-level prototype and have a guarantee that no bugs were
introduced in the process.
An optimised low-level energy estimation program has only 9 instructions:
energyEstimateLowLevel :: Script
energyEstimateLowLevel = do
let { t1 = 0; t2 = 1; p1 = 2; p2 = 3 }
ld r0 t1
sub r0 t2
abs r0
ld r1 p1
add r1 p2
st r1 p2
mul r0 p2
sra_i r0 1
halt
Below we define the equivalence check of this low-level program with the high-
level program energyEstimateHighLevel introduced earlier.
equivalence = do
t1 <- forall "t1"
t2 <- forall "t2"
p1 <- forall "p1"
p2 <- forall "p2"
constrain $ t1 .>= 0 &&& t1 .<= toMilliSeconds (30 :: Year)
constrain $ t2 .>= 0 &&& t2 .<= toMilliSeconds (30 :: Year)
constrain $ p1 .>= 0 &&& p1 .<= toMilliWatts ( 1 :: Watt)
constrain $ p2 .>= 0 &&& p2 .<= toMilliWatts ( 1 :: Watt)
let dataMemory = [t1, t2, p1, p2, 0, 100]
llFinalState = simulate 100 (boot energyEstimateLowLevel dataMemory)
hlFinalState = simulate 100 (boot energyEstimateHighLevel dataMemory)
llResult = readArray (registers llFinalState) r0
hlResult = readArray (registers hlFinalState) r0
return $ llResult .== hlResult
We run Z3 (now on 52 SMT clauses) and get the affirmative result in 11.5s:
> proveWith z3 equivalence
Q.E.D.
Program timing analysis The REDFIN semantic core implements the system
clock tracking with the delay function:
delay :: Clock -> Redfin ()
delay cycles = Redfin $ \s -> ((), s { clock = clock s + cycles })
13
Every execution step – a call of the executeInstruction function – advances
the clock by the number of cycles required to do the associated computation
as well as memory and register accesses. The tracking is precisely matched to
the hardware implementation and enables the engineers to perform best/worst
case execution timing analysis exploiting the optimisation facilities provided by
SBV and Z3. As an example, let us determine the minimum and maximum
number of clock cycles required for executing energyEstimateLowLevel. For
the sake of making this example more interesting, we modified the semantics of
the instruction abs and added 1 extra clock cycle in case of a negative argument
by conditionally performing delay 1 in the state transformer abs.
timingAnalysis = optimize Independent $ do
t1 <- exists "t1"
t2 <- exists "t2"
p1 <- exists "p1"
p2 <- exists "p2"
constrain $ t1 .>= 0 &&& t1 .<= toMilliSeconds (30 :: Year)
constrain $ t2 .>= 0 &&& t2 .<= toMilliSeconds (30 :: Year)
constrain $ p1 .>= 0 &&& p1 .<= toMilliWatts ( 1 :: Watt)
constrain $ p2 .>= 0 &&& p2 .<= toMilliWatts ( 1 :: Watt)
let dataMemory = [t1, t2, p1, p2, 0, 100]
finalState = simulate 100 (boot energyEstimateLowLevel dataMemory)
-- Specify independent optimisation goals:
minimize "Best case" (clock finalState)
maximize "Worst case" (clock finalState)
The total delay of the program depends only on the sign of t1− t2, thus the best
and worst cases differ only by one clock cycle. The worst case is achieved when
the difference is negative (t1 − t2 = −2), as shown below. Z3 finishes in 0.5s.
Objective "Best case":
Optimal model:
t1 = 549755813888
t2 = 17179869184
p1 = 0
p2 = 0
Best case = 12
Objective "Worst case":
Optimal model:
t1 = 65535
t2 = 65537
p1 = 0
p2 = 0
Worst case = 13
5 Discussion
The presented approach has been implemented and is planned to be released at
the conference (this paper is currently under review). In this section we discuss
our main design choices and achieved results, comparing them with the project’s
initial goals: (i) providing a unified specification, testing, and formal verification
framework that is (ii) understandable and convenient to use by the REDFIN
engineering team, and (iii) allows the team to co-develop REDFIN software and
hardware, by extending and modifying the default instruction semantics.
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5.1 From hardware to untyped assembly to typed software
The proposed approach covers two levels of organisation of computer systems:
the hardware microarchitecture (the state monad Redfin, §3), and the instruc-
tion set architecture (the assembly monad Script, §4). These two levels are
very different: the former allows hardware engineers to precisely capture the pro-
gram semantics (and has proven useful in exposing underspecified behaviours),
whereas the latter does not have a direct access to the microarchitectural level
and is used to symbolically execute the semantics, allowing software engineers
to observe the results and reason about program correctness.
By using Haskell as a metalanguage, we provided a purely syntactic imple-
mentation of a higher-level abstraction on top of the REDFIN assembly — a
statically-typed language for arithmetic expressions. This demonstrates that the
user of the verification framework has enough power to implement their own
domain-specific extensions of the REDFIN assembly.
Although our current implementation is written in Haskell, the presented
ideas can be implemented in many other languages. We chose Haskell for its built-
in support for polymorphic expressions, powerful do-notation, and availability
of a mature symbolic manipulation library (SBV). We also have a prototype
implementation in Idris, a much younger language that features dependent types
and hence allows us to verify more sophisticated properties at the type level [4],
however at the time of writing there is no equivalent of the SBV library in
Idris, which is a significant practical disadvantage. Dependent Haskell [24], once
implemented, will provide a convenient alternative.
5.2 Uniform development, testing and verification environment
The Script monad was engineered to provide familiar assembly mnemonics and
directives (e.g. data and instruction labels), which allows engineers to start using
the framework for developing REDFIN programs even without prior experience
of Haskell development, hopefully increasing the uptake of the framework.
Thanks to symbolic simulation, we can uniformly handle both concrete and
symbolic values, thus testing becomes just a special case of formal verification,
allowing the engineers to reuse a common code base and infrastructure. Test-
ing yields trivial SMT problems that can be solved in sub-second time for all
programs of realistic sizes (typical REDFIN programs have hundreds of instruc-
tions). Formal verification is more expensive: in our experiments, we could han-
dle programs comprising hundreds of instructions in 10-15 minutes, but one can
easily construct small programs that will grind any SMT solver to a halt: for ex-
ample, analysis of a single multiplication instruction mul can take half an hour if
it is required to factor 64-bit numbers (try factoring 4611686585363088391 with
an SMT solver). In such cases, conservatively proving some of the correctness
properties at the type level can significantly increase the productivity.
Although proving properties about the hardware implementation is left for
future work, the developed infrastructure provides a way to generate testsuites
for the processing core from the formal semantics of REDFIN instructions. Fur-
thermore, one can use the semantics to generate parts of the hardware imple-
mentation [20] or synthesise efficient instruction subsets [17].
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6 Related Work
There is a vast body of literature available on the topic of formal verification,
including verification of hardware processing cores and low-level software pro-
grams. Our work builds in a substantial way on a few known ideas that we
will review in this section. We thank the formal verification and programming
languages communities and hope that the formal semantics of the REDFIN pro-
cessing core will provide a new interesting benchmark for future studies.
We model the REDFIN microarchitecture using a monadic state transformer
metalanguage. There are several examples of prior work exploiting this idea. Fox
and Myreen [9] formalise the Arm v7 instruction set architecture in HOL4 and
give a careful account to bit-accurate proofs of the instruction decoder correct-
ness. Later, Kennedy et al. [12] formalised a subset of the x86 architecture in Coq,
using monads for instruction execution semantics and monadic do-notation for
assembly language embedding. Both these models are formalised in proof assis-
tants, thus are powered by full dependent types, which allow the usage of mech-
anised program correctness proofs. Degenbaev [7] formally specifies the complete
x86 instruction set – a truly monumental effort! – using a custom domain-specific
language that can be translated to a formal proof system. Arm’s Architecture
Specification Language has been developed for the same purpose to formalise
the Arm v8 instruction set [20]. Our specification approach is similar to these
two works, but we operate on a much smaller scale of the REDFIN core.
Our monadic metalanguage is embedded in Haskell and does not have a rig-
orous formalisation, i.e. we cannot prove correctness of the REDFIN semantics
itself (this is a common concern, e.g. see [19]). Moreover, our verification work-
flow mainly relies on automated theorem proving, rather than on interactive one.
This is motivated by the cost of precise proof assistant formalisations in terms
of human resources: automated techniques are more CPU-intensive, but cause
less “human-scaling issues” (Reid at al. [20]). Our goal was to create a frame-
work that could be seamlessly integrated into an existing spacecraft engineering
workflow, therefore it needed to have as much proof automation as possible. The
automation is achieved by means of symbolic program execution. Currie at al. [5]
applied symbolic execution with uninterpreted functions to prove equivalence of
low-level assembly programs. The framework we present allows not only proving
the equivalence of low-level programs, but also their compliance with higher-level
specifications written in a subset of Haskell.
A lot of research work has been done on the design of typed assembly lan-
guages, e.g. see [10][18]. The low-level REDFIN assembly is untyped, but the
syntactic language of arithmetic expressions that we implemented on top of it
does have a simple type system. In principle, the REDFIN assembly itself may
benefit from a richer type system, especially one enforcing correct operation with
relevant mission-specific units of measurement [13].
Finally, we would like to acknowledge several related projects, blogposts and
talks that provided an initial inspiration for this work: the ‘Monads to Machine
Code’ compiler by Diehl [8], RISC-V semantics in Haskell by MIT [16], Wall’s
assembly monad [23], and SMT-based program analysis by Jelvis [11].
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7 Conclusions and opportunities for future research
This paper presents a formal verification approach developed to tackle a real
engineering problem by combining known techniques from the formal verification
and programming languages research communities. We demonstrated that these
techniques can be applied to create a formal model of the spacecraft processing
core REDFIN that is used to execute small control programs, and showed how
to formally verify such programs. By releasing the state transformer semantics
to public, we hope to provide other researchers with a realistic benchmark for
their formal verification tools. We also invite them to contribute to the REDFIN
toolchain itself. Below we list opportunities for future research.
7.1 Dependently-typed high-level DSL for REDFIN programs
On top of low-level REDFIN assembly we implemented a high-level arithmetic
expression language with a simple type system to distinguish between variables
using different number representation and measurement units. This very simple
type system already helps to eliminate an important class of bugs with the help
of Haskell’s type checker. However, a dependently-typed host language, such
as Agda, Coq, Dependent Haskell, or Idris, could provide us much more power.
One example is compile-time elimination of out-of-memory access that can occur
when branching to a non-existent program location or overflowing the stack.
7.2 System-level verification via strongly typed protocols
The REDFIN instruction set architecture has a number of bus-communication
instructions to access the system bus. An interesting research problem is imple-
menting a model of a complete space system in an advanced typed programming
language by modelling each component separately and later integrating them
using shared types specifying the communication protocol. We can then derive
bus-communication code from the protocol specification, while sharing the same
types on both sides will allow ensuring the correctness of communication. Similar
work has been done in the context of web systems [15].
7.3 Hardware synthesis
The state transformer metalanguage presented in the paper makes the system
state explicit and employs Haskell’s advanced abstractions to make the state
manipulation safe and structured. To convey the model’s verification power
down to the bare metal, we can implement a verified translation from the state-
transformer metalanguage to a hardware description language to petrify the
semantics and turn it into silicon.
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